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ABSTRACT 
We study social organizations with 
possible coexistence at equilibrium of 
cooperating individuals and pure consumers 
(free-riders). We investigate this polymorphic 
equilibrium using a game-theoretic approach and 
a statistical physics analysis of a simple model. 
The agents face a binary decision problem: 
whether to contribute or not to the public good, 
through the maximization of an additive utility 
that has two competing terms, a fixed cost for 
cooperating and an idiosyncratic moral cost for 
free-riding proportional to the fraction of 
cooperators. We study the equilibria regimes of 
this model. We show that there is a fraction of 
expected cooperators below which cooperation 
fails to emerge. Besides the homogeneous stable 
equilibria (everybody cooperates or everybody 
free-rides), it exists a solution in which 
cooperators coexist with free-riders.  This 
polymorphic equilibrium is a consequence of the 
heterogeneous (idiosyncratic) perceptions of the 
social reproval by the different individuals. We 
provide analytic results in the case of a simple 
distribution of the idiosyncratic moral weights, 
and discuss them on the basis of concepts of 
game theory.  
INTRODUCTION 
Basic evidence on several kinds of social 
organizations whose members are expected to 
cooperate to a public good reveals a rough 
partition between individuals that cooperate to 
the public good and pure consumers (also called 
free-riders). This polymorphic configuration 
seems to be a stable form of organization. We 
propose a model that exhibits the emergence of 
such polymorphic equilibria.   
From a theoretical point of view, there is a 
large field of research that tries to explain why 
cooperation may emerge as a stable behaviour 
among selfish individuals. It is well known that 
collective action has the structure of a public 
good problem, of which the prisoner's dilemma 
is a special case. Those who do not participate to 
the collective production of the good are not 
excluded from its consumption. Olson (1965) 
and early literature about the prisoner's dilemma 
predict that individuals have no interest to 
cooperate in the production of a public good, and 
behave like free-riders. The literature of 
experimental economics has tested this 
conjecture. Stable cooperation is seldom attained 
in finitely repeated public good games (Ledyard, 
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1995). Typically, although there may be 
substantial cooperation in the first periods, the 
level of cooperation decreases through time.  
Fehr and Gachter (2000) compare situations 
where individuals have opportunities for 
punishing non-cooperators to situations where 
punishment is absent. They show that 
introducing a punishment opportunity for the 
players leads to an increase in cooperation with 
achievement of almost full cooperation in the 
last period. This was particularly true for the 
partner design of their game, in which the same 
players interact in all the periods. Another way 
of enforcing cooperation is through social 
approval of cooperation or disapproval of 
defection. Gachter and Fehr (1999) consider the 
importance of social approval and peer pressure 
on the individuals' behaviours in a public good 
setting. Individuals may value approval from 
their peers to a generous contribution from their 
part. They may also value negatively their own 
free-riding behaviour when peers contribute. The 
important point of their paper is that the feeling 
of group membership and social approval give 
rise to a large and significant reduction in free-
riding. A social norm of high and stable 
cooperation needs thus some enforcement in 
order to emerge. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) 
examine whether the individuals are willing to 
support the cost of enforcement.   
The model presented in this paper is 
related to the important body of literature about 
collective action, recently reviewed by Ostrom 
(2000) as well as the sociological literature on 
threshold models (following Granovetter 1978) 
and critical mass models (Schelling 1978). For a 
survey of the sociological approach see Olivier 
et al. (1993) and Marwell et al. (2001) among 
others. We analyze a simple situation that 
corresponds to the following typical scenario: 
the members of an organization have to share a 
task whose realization is beneficial for 
everybody. Cooperators bear a fixed cost for 
producing the public good for the community. 
The surplus of all the individuals increases 
proportionally to the number of cooperators. 
Individuals that do not cooperate are punished by 
cooperators through costless moral disapproval. 
We assume that the costs that come into play are 
smaller than the agents' endowments, so that the 
strategy that consists in resigning is not credible. 
We study the regimes of equilibrium in 
games where the individuals are heterogeneous 
with respect to the value they assign to social 
disapproval: the cost experienced by a free-rider, 
proportional to the fraction of cooperators, is 
idiosyncratically weighted. We do not consider 
an explicit model of this cost: it may be either a 
subjective moral burden, or a true sanction. Our 
main question concerns the conditions under 
which a polymorphic community with both free-
riders and cooperators may exist in equilibrium, 
and whether there is some threshold of 
cooperation level below which such a 
community cannot be stabilized. 
The paper is organized as follows: a first 
section presents the details of the model, which 
considers the individual decision by the agents 
given the social context. The following sections 
are devoted to the study of the equilibrium 
regimes in a typical case, including dynamical 
considerations for a simple expectations learning 
rule. 
BASIC MODEL OF BINARY CHOICES 
WITH SOCIAL SANCTIONS 
The basic economic model analyzed in this 
paper is a particular case of a more general class 
of models of three strategies studied in Phan et 
al. (2005), where in addition to the choice 
between cooperation and defection, an agent 
must simultaneously decide whether to 
participate or not. These are generalizations of 
earlier models of binary choices with 
externalities (Durlauf, S. 1997; Nadal, J-P. et al. 
2003, 2004; Phan, D. et al. 2004; Gordon, M.B. 
et al. 2005a).  
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We consider a population of N agents. 
Each agent i (1§ i§N) makes one among the 
following choices: 
ride)-free  (to   0s
cooperate)  (to    1s
i
i
=
=
 (1) 
Each agent i have a social network of partners (a 
subset iν  of the population, of cardinal Ni) who 
also have to decide which strategy to choose. We 
assume that each individual i that chooses to 
cooperate (si=1) bears a fixed cost Ci. Free-riders 
bear a cost due to social disapproval by their 
partners. There is thus a social dimension in the 
model, related to the network of relations of the 
agent, hereafter called his neighbourhood.  
The fraction of cooperators in the 
neighbourhood of i is denoted ηc (to simplify the 
notation we do not write a supplementary 
subscript i -as we should, since these quantities 
depend on i's neighbourhood-), and that of free-
riders is 1-ηc. Explicitly: 
∑
ν∈
=η
ik
k
i
c sN
1  (2)    
We assume that each agent has a linear 
surplus function Vi. It includes a constant term H 
which is the monetary equivalent of the benefit 
of belonging to the community (equivalent to the 
initial endowment in experimental settings). Its 
value is assumed to be large enough so that the 
agents can afford the costs of their decisions. 
Beyond H, each agent has a payoff that depends 
on the behaviour of the other agents. Thus, the 
surplus function is 
ciiiiccii X)s1(CsGH)s(V η−−−η+=η  (3) 
where G/Ni is the social payoff earned by agent i 
thanks to each cooperator in his neighbourhood. 
A free-rider (si = 0) supports instead a cost 
inflicted by each of his neighbours that 
cooperate. According to the literature on moral 
features and norms enforcement (i.e. Harsanyi 
1977, Rabin 1993, Gächter and Fehr 1999, Fehr 
and Gächter 2002) this cost may be of different 
natures: it may represent an unmodeled feature 
external to the agent i, like a real sanction, or 
merely an internal moral disagreement -like 
guilt- due to the existence of cooperating 
neighbours. In our model, all the neighbours are 
assumed to produce the same marginal effect on 
individual i (if he free-rides), equal to Xi/Ni, 
where Xi¥0 is an idiosyncratic weight.  
INDIVIDUAL BEST RESPONSE 
ANALYSIS 
The surplus (3) can equivalently be written 
as 
cicii
iccii
)XG(H)0s(V
CGH)1s(V
η−+=η=
−η+=η=
 (4) 
Following Phan (2004), and Phan, 
Waldeck, Gordon and Nadal (2005), the surplus 
of an individual playing "against a field" of 
neighbours with a proportion ηc of cooperators 
and 1-ηc of defectors in equation (4) can be 
decomposed into the weighted sum of 
corresponding payoffs in a pure strategy game. 
The corresponding two-by-two normal form of 
the game is presented on Table 1.  
sk = 1 sk = 0 
si = 1 (H+G-Ci)/Ni (H-Ci)/Ni 
si = 0 (H+G-Xi)/Ni H/Ni 
Table 1: Payoff matrix of agent i in a bilateral 
game against agent k  
(player i in rows, player k  in columns) 
Following Monderer and Shapley (1996) 
this game belong to the class of (weighted) 
potential games. That is, best-reply sets and 
dominance-orderings are unaffected if a constant 
term is added to a column, and if all the columns 
are multiplied by a constant. The best reply 
equivalent of the game is given in Table 2, where 
the columns correspond to the strategies played 
by an agent representative of the neighbourhood 
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of agent i, who plays s=1 with frequency ηc and 
s=0 with frequency 1-ηc.  This game belongs to 
the class of coordination games. The payoffs of 
coordination on the same strategy allow to 
calculate the cost of unilateral deviation.  
 s = 1 
(frequency ηc) 
s = 0 
(frequency 1- ηc) 
si = 1 Xi − Ci 0 
si = 0 0 Ci 
Table 2: Equivalent payoff matrix of agent i in 
a bilateral game against the field 
In a population game context this cost is not just 
the corresponding payoff, as in a pure strategy 
context, but the sum of two terms: the loss of 
changing the strategy against the fraction of the 
population coordinated with the agent minus the 
payoff earned thanks to the (ex-ante) proportion 
of players playing the other strategy. More 
specifically, the cost of deviating from si = 1 is 
ηc(Xi − Ci), but playing si = 0 allows coordination 
with the fraction 1 − ηc of the "field" playing 
strategy s = 0, so that the actual cost of deviation 
is thus  ηc(Xi − Ci) − (1 − ηc) Ci = ηcXi − Ci.  
Inspection of Table 2 shows that the 
strategy si = 1 is better off than si = 0 against ηc 
cooperators if ηc(Xi − Ci)>(1 − ηc) Ci, that is: 
ci
i
ii
1
C
X0s1s
η
>⇔==  (5) 
The marginal agent with Xi/Ci=1/ηc is 
indifferent between cooperating and defecting. 
Notice that although the outcome of the game is 
independent of the parameters G and H, they are 
essential in the game setting. G (¥0) determines 
the relative social benefit due to the existence of 
cooperators. As already stated, we assume that 
the value of H is high enough for the payoffs be 
positive whatever the agents' decisions, to ensure 
it is worth for all the agents to play the game. 
Comparison of the payoff of strategy si= 1 
versus that of si= 0 on the basis of the parameters 
Ci and Xi gives raise to the following typology of 
agents: 
1. If Xi § Ci, since Xiηc § Xi, it is clear that si=0 
is a strictly dominant strategy against si=1 
for all values of ηc. Agents satisfying this 
inequality always defect: they are intrinsic 
free-riders.  
2. If Ci < Xi, then si=0 may still be a best 
response against s=1, but since free-riding 
depends on the value of ηc -see equation (5)- 
these agents are not intrinsic free-riders, and 
in fact at equilibrium a fraction, and 
eventually all, of them will be able to 
cooperate.   
Let us remark that if all the individuals are of 
type 1, which arises when the largest 
idiosyncratic weight in the population, Xmax, is 
such that Xmax § Ci for all i, then the Nash 
equilibrium with si = 0 for all i is unique and the 
game is a prisoner's dilemma. 
The general class of bilateral games with 
Ci ≤ Xmin is coordination games with two 
equilibria in pure strategies and a single one in 
mixed strategies. In the case considered in the 
present paper, each individual plays 
simultaneously against all his neighbours (the 
"field"), making the issue more involved.  
EQUILIBRIUM PROPERTIES OF LARGE 
POPULATIONS 
In the rest of this paper we make the 
following simplifying assumptions: 
• The cost of cooperation is the same for all the 
agents, Ci = C, 
• The idiosyncratic weights Xi are quenched (i.e. 
constant in time) positive random variables, 
independently and identically distributed 
throughout the population, with a probability 
density function f(X) with finite support  
(0 § Xmin §  X § Xmax)  
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• The value of H satisfies H > max{C,Xmax− G} 
to ensure that no agent has a negative payoff, 
whatever the adopted strategy. 
• The networks of relations have the same 
structure (homogenous neighbourhood) for all 
the agents. Moreover, we assume complete 
connectivity between agents. Thus, the 
neighbourhood of an agent i, νi in equation 
(2), is the set of all the individuals in the 
population but himself (Ni = N − 1).  
We are interested in the properties of very 
large populations; thus we consider the limit  
NØ¶. The fraction of cooperators in the 
neighbourhood of any agent differs from the 
total fraction of cooperators in the population by 
at most 1 / (N − 1), which is negligible in this 
limit.  
Since we consider full connectivity in the 
limit NØ¶,  the fraction of cooperators is an 
unbiased estimator of the probability of 
cooperating, over the random variable Xi. Let us 
define the marginal agent having a value of Xi 
equal to ( )
c
cm
CX
η
≡η , such as he is indifferent 
between cooperating or not. Then, the 
equilibrium state of the population satisfies: 
( )
( ))(X
)(XXs
N
1
cm
cm
N
1i
ic
ηΦ=
η>==η ∑
=
P
 (6) 
where ∫
∞
≡Φ
X
'dX)'X(f)X(  is the complementary 
distribution function of the random variable X. 
Equation (6) is a fixed point equation for the 
fraction of cooperators. Since Xi¥0, a necessary 
condition for having full cooperation is that  
C § Xmin, where Xmin is the lower bound of the 
support of f(X). That is: only if the cost of 
cooperation is smaller than the punishment 
afforded for free-riding for all the individuals in 
the population, then full cooperation may be 
achieved. Notice however that even in this case, 
this stable solution may not be reached in actual 
systems, because hc=0 is always a solution of (6). 
As soon as some individuals have Xi>C (more 
precisely, a fraction of individuals of finite 
measure), we have a polymorphic equilibrium 
where cooperators and free-riders may coexist. 
The actual proportion of individuals that 
cooperate depends on the particular distribution 
of X. Since C is finite, if the support of f(X) is 
unbounded, the polymorphic equilibrium is 
generic. But if the support of f(X) is bounded 
and C > Xmax, the population is no more 
polymorphic since only the solution hc=0 exists, 
with all the agents have vanishing social utility. 
Figure 1 presents a qualitative picture of the 
agents' typology in the case of a bounded 
support.  
 
0
free-riders
Xm(ηc)=C/ηc
Xmax
 
 
X
Xmin
f(X)
intrinsic free-riders
cooperators
C
Figure 1. Qualitative typology 
It is useful to define reduced variables, 
x ª X/d and c ª C/d, where d is the width of the 
distribution f(X). Then equation (6) is equivalent 
to  
( )zc Γ=  (7) 
where z ª c/hc and: 
( ) ( )zzz Φ=Γ . (8) 
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UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION 
As an example, we consider the case of X 
drawn from a uniform distribution with support 
in [Xmin,Xmax], dªXmax-Xmin. Then, f(X)=1/d. In 
terms of the reduced variables,  


 ≤≤=
otherwise0
xxxif1
)x(f maxmin  (9) 
and the corresponding cumulative function is: 




≤
≤≤−
≤
=
=Φ ∫
min
maxminmax
max
x
x
xx
xxx
if
if
1
xx
xxif0
'dx)'x(f)x(
max
 (10) 
Then,   
( ) ( )




≤
≤≤−
≤
=Γ
min
maxminmax
max
xz
xzx
if
if
z
zxz
zxif0
z  (11) 
Figures 2a and 2b represent Γ(z) for particular 
values of xmin and xmax.  
Remembering that hc=0 is always a 
solution, we are left to determine if there exists 
another solution, hc=c/z, where z is given by the 
intersection between Γ(z) and the constant line 
z=c (see equation (7)). Let us denote  
c* ª (xmax/2)2  (12) 
the maximum of the quadratic part of Γ(z). We 
have two possible cases, depending on the 
position of the maximum of the quadratic part of 
Γ(z): 
• xmin§1 (or equivalently, xmax¥2xmin) (see 
Figure 2a). Then 
º if c>c*, only solution hc=0 exists. 
º if xmin § c < c*, there are two intersections 
with Γ(z), but only the one corresponding to 
the smallest value of z is stable, since the 
corresponding fraction of cooperators 
increases if the  (reduced) cost decreases, as 
it should. The other intersection corresponds 
to a fraction of cooperators that would 
increase if the cost of cooperating increases. 
Thus: 
( )*cc11*cc −+=η  (12) 
 and we have 2
x*c0 maxc =≤η≤ . In 
this solution the population is composed of 
a fraction ηc of cooperators and a fraction 
1-ηc of free-riders, that is, the population is 
polymorphic, like in most of the 
experimental economic settings.   
º if c§xmin, the stable solution lies in the 
linear part of Γ(z), so that ηc=1 is a possible 
solution. 
0 1 2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
xmin
c*
xmax◊c*
 
 
Γ(z)
z
xmin
xmin=0.5 ; xmax=1.5
 
Figure 2a.  An example of Γ(z) with xmin<1. 
0 1 2 3
0
1
xmin
xmin=1.4 ; xmax=2.4
c*
xmax◊c*
 
 
Γ(z)
z
xmin
 
Figure 2b.  An example of Γ(z) with xmin>1. 
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• xmin>1 (or equivalently, xmax<2xmin) (see 
Figure 2b). Then 
º if c>xmin, only the solution hc=0 exists. 
º if 0<c<xmin, the stable solution lies on the 
linear part of Γ(z), so that the full 
cooperation solution ηc=1 also exists. 
Since xmax=1+xmin is not an independent 
variable, the above results may be visualized on 
a phase diagram in the plane (c,xmin), represented 
on Figure 3, that shows the regions in the 
parameters space corresponding to the different 
solutions.  
0.0 0.5 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
4
3
2
ηc=0
ηc=1
c=xmin
 
 
c=C/d
xmin=Xmin/d
ηc=0
c=c*ηc=0
0<ηc<1
1
 
Figure 3. Phase diagram presenting the 
domains of existence of the different solutions. 
Notice that the solution with only free-
riders (hc=0) exists for all the values of the 
parameters. In the regions where a solution with 
finite rates of cooperation exists, it is in 
competition with the former. Which one will be 
realized in an actual situation depends on the 
cognitive properties of the agents. In the simplest 
case of myopic best response in a repeated game 
with full information, it depends on the initial 
guesses by the agents about the expected fraction 
of cooperators. This situation is typical of 
coordination games.  
If the cost of cooperation vanishes (C = 0, 
so that c = 0), there are two possible issues: 
either all the individuals cooperate, earning 
H + G − C each, or they are all free-riders, with a 
payoff H − Xi, which may be smaller than the 
former. The stable equilibria correspond to the 
entire population selecting the same strategy.  
If the cost of cooperation does not vanish, 
if C§Xmin the situation remains the same as with 
C=0. But if C>Xmin, as far as it remains smaller 
than
d4
X*cd*C
2
max=≡ , the fraction of 
cooperators, given by equation (12), becomes 
smaller than 1, and reaches its smallest value at 
the border C=C*, where it takes the 
value
d2
Xmax*
c =η . This polymorphic solution, 
with a fraction ηc<1 of cooperators and 1-ηc 
free-riders only exists if Xmin < Xmax/2 . The 
corresponding parameter values are represented 
in light grey on figure 3. 
Increasing the cost beyond max{C*, Xmin} 
hinders cooperation, and the only stable solution 
is free-riding.   
Although the above results are specific of 
our assumption of a uniform idiosyncratic 
weights distribution f(X), we expect similar 
behaviours for more general distributions: if the 
cost is smaller than the lower bound of the 
distribution’s support, we expect full cooperation 
to be a stable equilibrium in competition with 
another one corresponding to all the population 
free-riding. However, if the cost increases, a 
novel polymorphic solution appears, in which 
cooperators coexist in equilibrium with free 
riders. The range of parameter values 
corresponding to this solution depends on the 
details of the distribution. In the case of a 
uniform distribution considered here, this phase 
exists for costs between Xmin and C*. The 
corresponding fraction of cooperators is a 
decreasing function of the cost, and lies between 
ηc = 1 (for c = Xmin) and ηc = Xmax/2d (for C = C*).   
If the cost is larger than C*, a distribution-
dependent critical value, the solution with 100% 
of free-riders is the only viable.  
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DYNAMIC FEATURES 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
Figure 4.1 Xmin=0.6, Xmax=4.6, C=1 (point 1 in 
fig. 3: xmin=0.15,c=0.25) Possible paths are 
indicated with dashed lines - - - 
In the case of a myopic best reply 
dynamics, individuals are assumed to know the 
number of cooperators at time t − 1, and play 
their corresponding best responses at time t. In 
this case, each individual evaluates the payoffs 
according to: 
)1t()XG(H))1t(0s(V
C)1t(GH))1t(1s(V
cicii
ccii
−η−+=−η=
−−η+=−η=
 (13) 
where ηc(t-1) is 
∑
=
−=−η
N
1k
kc )1t(sN
1)1t(  (14) 
For large N this gives the following dynamics: 
( ) ( )( )t1t cc ηΦ=+η  (15) 
Depending on the initial conditions (the 
configuration of strategies at the beginning of 
the simulations, {si(t=0), 1§i§N}), the evolution 
of the fraction of cooperators may follow 
different paths: if there is a single solution, it 
will converge to it, but if there are two possible 
solutions, like in the grey regions of Figure 3, 
the reached equilibrium depends on the initial 
conditions. Figures 4 present y = Φ(Xm(η)) given 
by equation (10), as a function of η (thick curves). 
The intersections with the diagonals (the lines y = 
η) satisfy equation (6) - or its equivalent (7). The 
broken lines show the learning paths, for the 
parameter values corresponding to the four 
points indicated on figure 3. When there are 
more than one fixed point, paths leading to both 
fixed points are represented. 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
Figure 4.2 Xmin=1.5, Xmax=11.5, C=1  
(point 2 in fig. 3: xmin=0.5,c=0.1) 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
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Figure 4.3 Xmin= 2.2, Xmax= 4.2, C = 1  
(point 3 in fig. 3: xmin= 1.1,c = 0.5) 
 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
Figure 4.4 Xmin=0.83, Xmax=1.94, C=1 
(point 4 in fig. 3: xmin=0.75,c=0.9) 
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DISCUSSION 
A major interest of population game theory is 
to provide foundations on equilibrium selection 
without the assumption of common knowledge 
(Canning 1995, Blume 1997, Young 1998). Players 
observe only the strategy of their opponents and 
have behavioural cognitive capacity (Walliser 1989). 
That is, players only maximize their payoff 
according to simple beliefs built on past observations 
- i.e. myopic expectations or more general 
expectations like Camerer’s EWA schemes (Camerer 
and Ho 1999, Camerer 2003). In our model, each 
agent plays against the field, i.e. play the same 
strategy against all agents in his neighbourhood 
(Maynard Smith 1982, Crawford, 1990).  
The key feature of our discrete choice 
population game model is that the values Xi are 
spread over a bounded support [Xmin,Xmax]. As a 
consequence, bilateral games are asymmetric 
with respect to the payoffs: all the players have 
different preferences over the same strategic set. 
Because agents play against the field, it is 
nevertheless possible to identify in the phase-
diagram some sub-domains where symmetric 
games concepts and results apply (see also 
Schmeidler, 1973, and Blonski, 1999). These 
sub-domains lie in the regions where either ηc=0 
or ηc=1, because in that cases the cost of 
deviation, ηcXi – C, is either – C or Xi – C. 
Because all the agents play the same strategy, we 
can analyze the structure of best response despite 
the heterogeneity of the individual payoffs, and 
relate some of our results to well known 
concepts in a symmetric population games 
In the game with asymmetric payoffs 
corresponding to our model, we identify the 
following parameter configurations (see Figure 5):  
1. If c > xmax = xmin + 1 then all agents have 
xi § c and are intrinsic free-riders, as 
already discussed in the typology presented 
in the section “Individual Best Response 
Analysis”. si = 0 is a strictly dominant 
strategy against si = 1 for all values of η. 
This zone is located in the north-west of the 
phase-diagram above the line c = xmin + 1. 
The only one equilibrium is si = 0 for all 
agents, that is, ηc=1. The corresponding 
game is a prisoner’s dilemma.  
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
prisoner
dilemma stag hunt
Risk dominant
c
xmin
50%
c=xmin
c=xmax
c=xminê2
c=xmaxê2
 
Figure 5. Correspondence with game theory  
2. If c < xmin, the best reply depends on the 
choice of all the population. This choice is 
homogeneous, despite the difference in the 
payoffs. In this zone, all agents have 
positive values in the diagonal of Table 2. 
The game belongs to the class of 
coordination games. We obtain two Nash 
equilibria, si = 0 for all i or si = 1 for all i. 
It is possible to rank both equilibria 
according to Pareto dominance and risk 
dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). 
Since all agents have xi > c, the equilibrium 
si = 1 Pareto dominates the equilibrium si = 0 
since:  H  + G – C > 0 for all i. Depending 
on the value of c we identify several regions: 
2.1. Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988), 
a bilateral equilibrium of coordination 
between two agents in the cooperation 
strategy (si = 1) in Table 2 is said to be 
risk dominated if c2 > (xi – c) (xj – c). 
This condition is satisfied for all xi if 
minx c c *> >  with c* given by 
equation (12), for then xmax/2 < c < xmin, 
so that 0 < xi − c < c for all the 
individuals. A unilateral deviation 
M. B. Gordon, D. Phan, R. Waldeck, J-P. Nadal 
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from the pure strategic equilibrium of 
coordination on cooperation (si = 1) is 
costly for both players, for each couple 
of players taken at random in the 
population, and as a consequence for 
the game against the field. Thus, in this 
region in the phase diagram the 
coordination game belongs the class of 
the so called: “stag hunt” game, in 
which the Pareto dominant equilibrium 
ηc=1 is risk dominated by ηc=0.  
2.2. In the sub-region with c < xmin / 2, 
the xi satisfy xi − c > c for all ì. 
Coordination on the cooperation 
strategy (si = 1) is both Pareto 
dominant and risk dominant since all 
bilateral equilibria of coordination 
on cooperation (si = 1) between any 
two agents (i,j) satisfy:  
c2 < ( xi – c) (xj – c) for all xi, xj 
3. In the intermediate zone: xmin < c ≤ xmax, the 
population of agents is heterogeneous with 
respect to the dominance structure of their 
payoff matrix. Some of them are intrinsic 
free-riders, while others as not. The relative 
weight of intrinsic free-riders is given by 
the relative values of the parameters xmin and 
c (see figure 1). Inside this region with 
heterogeneous dominance structure across 
agents, one of the two Nash equilibria is 
polymorphic: two different strategies 
(cooperation and free riding) coexist. 
CONCLUSION 
We analyzed a simple model showing that 
under very general conditions, polymorphic 
organizations may exist where cooperators 
coexist with free-riders. In our model, the 
individuals have an endowment H large enough 
to afford the cost due to cooperation or the 
(moral) cost of free-riding. The latter is 
proportional to the number of cooperators.  Its 
weight G > 0 sets a lower bound to the value of 
the individual endowment H for the model being 
consistent. Notice that the condition for 
cooperators to exist does not depend on the 
actual value of G1. The latter only affects the 
payoff, and ensures that the utilities are 
increasing functions of the degree of 
cooperation. 
We presented our results through the form 
of a phase diagram, exhibiting the regions in the 
parameter space where different equilibria are 
expected. Depending on the parameters these 
may correspond to full cooperation, pure free-
riding, or partial cooperation (the polymorphic 
equilibria). The existence of the latter is our most 
interesting result. It is a direct consequence of 
the heterogeneity in the agent’s perceptions, 
represented by the idiosyncratic weights Xi, of 
the punishments inflicted by the cooperators to 
free-riders. 
Free-riding is one among possible equilibrium 
for all the parameter values. Even in the region 
where full cooperation is stable; its outcome is in 
competition with pure free-riding. Thus, our 
model corresponds to a typical coordination 
game. The actual equilibrium reached by the 
system depends on the initial conditions. They 
determine the dynamical paths towards the 
stationary states of the system. 
We are currently investigating how these 
equilibria are modified if the agents have less 
information, and evaluate the expected utilities 
through different learning schemes. 
                                                          
1 In fact, we are considering in this paper a 
sub-problem of a more general situation where 
individuals may choose neither to cooperate nor 
to free-ride, i.e. to leave the organisation (Phan, 
Waldeck, Gordon and Nadal 2005).  
This work is a part of the project ELICCIR 
supported by the MNRT / CNRS program “Complex 
Systems for Human & Social Sciences” 
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